
@Stripe CEO, @ArcInstitute cofounder.
Joined April 2007
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Tyler and I just published a list of the recipients of the New Aesthetics grants: newaesthetics.art/grants.
Thank you very much to all who applied. There were far more applications than we expected. We funded 28 grantees and are excited to see what they create.
My reflections on the whole thing:
• Though there are clearly selection dynamics afoot, figuring out some route beyond the current aesthetic moment seems to be of wider interest in the art community than I would have guessed. Many applicants described their dissatisfaction with the status quo, some in strong terms. We had to close applications after a few weeks because there were so many.
• It's too early to call it, but it seems that both beauty as an unapologetic goal (contra much that is in modernist and contemporary approaches), and ways to channel pre-modern styles into something new for the present era, are of growing interest.
• The awards made me reflect on the perhaps obvious issue of how hard it must be for an artist to persistently do something new: schools, galleries, buyers, etc., all have structurally embedded preferences as well. These individual awards made me wonder what form supporting new clusters could take.
• Architecture seems to me like the discipline most ripe for new ideas. One correspondent observed: "American architects are somewhat constrained by the association with the academy, in addition to the well known regulation issues. There is a tendency to overthink things so that the designs are formally interesting to someone deep in the conversation, but lacking poetry and magic. There are more firms in Europe, South America and beyond that “just do things” (especially in places where it is easier to build)." This was evident in the submissions.
• AI seems to be making people rethink things in a quite fundamental way, just as urbanization/industrialization/popularization of photography did at the end of the 19th century. For some that will mean interesting new forms of AI-augmented art, but the effects of the rethinking will likely be wider.
• Arts funding is clearly as precarious and scarce as ever. That's unfortunate, but it probably also means that individual actors can have meaningful impact, and I encourage others to get involved if interested.
• There's a lot to know that is not written down, and I'm very grateful to those who have helped and advised me along the way.
New @stripepress site: stripe.press
Hugging Face + @OpenRouter:
Starting today, chat models on Hugging Face run through OpenRouter!
Open-weight models went from 27% to 72% of tokens on OpenRouter in under a year. A lot of that comes from two things: labs publishing their weights on Hugging Face 🤗, and dozens of providers competing to serve them on diverse dimensions.
Today we’re connecting the two. Chat models on the Hub now run through OpenRouter’s routing: 160 models from 38 labs, best provider picked per request, automatic failover, same HF token.
And your OpenRouter traces can now land in a Hugging Face bucket you own, ready for fine-tuning.
Excited to build this with @ClementDelangue, @julien_c, and the @huggingface team. More coming!
Patrick Collison retweeted
Starting today, chat models on Hugging Face run through OpenRouter!
Open-weight models went from 27% to 72% of tokens on OpenRouter in under a year. A lot of that comes from two things: labs publishing their weights on Hugging Face 🤗, and dozens of providers competing to serve them on diverse dimensions.
Today we’re connecting the two. Chat models on the Hub now run through OpenRouter’s routing: 160 models from 38 labs, best provider picked per request, automatic failover, same HF token.
And your OpenRouter traces can now land in a Hugging Face bucket you own, ready for fine-tuning.
Excited to build this with @ClementDelangue, @julien_c, and the @huggingface team. More coming!
Open models on @huggingface now run through OpenRouter.
Each request goes to the provider with the best price, speed, and uptime for that model, with automatic failover. Everything runs on the same Hugging Face token and API.
You can also send your traces to Hugging Face Storage with Broadcast, so your requests live on the Hub next to your models, ready for things like evals or fine-tuning.
Patrick Collison retweeted
There are many intellectuals & artists who aren’t commercially-motivated, but ~all are motivated by an orientation to human attention and judgment, and therefore intellectual achievement is an intensely social & network-based phenomenon. Randall Collins (a sociologist of this stuff, h/t @arnaudschenk) argues that even the solitary act of writing/thinking is motivated and steered by an imagined audience, and the emotional payoff that sustains that productivity is mostly interactions with other people where you focus on the same ideas and concepts. This is why the general equilibrium question is so important, over just whether you in theory can pursue a solitary life of intellectual excellence.
So if AI does all the frontier thinking, will there still be human intellectual activity? Yes, humans can still form groups that orient toward shared or conflicting ideas and get excited by talking to each other about them. But it can’t be organized around insights. There will be no great orientation of human collective effort toward novel insight (or prerequisites to that alone) if that is no longer a path to emotional payoff from peer attention (even though this peer attention can be completely non-monetary!). It could reorganize around human competition in relaying discoveries or insights, or debating in front of human judges (though this is more a sport than science/philosophy), and that will very likely happen and keep some intellectual skills sharp. Moral philosophy is the one thing that will continue because it is grounded in humans (contra claims that the AI can just derive our “utility function”); if anything it will get more intense with AI assistance and fewer other things taking attention.
It is possible that those interested in ideas will not form human networks because the AIs are better partners in the interaction rituals that maintain emotional investment in ideas. This depends on how much the humanness matters intrinsically, versus just the perception of intelligent attention on the same topic. It seems quite likely this will decouple, and people will spend 1-1 time talking with AIs about ideas, learning from superhuman explanations and insights, and then go have in-person interactions with humans where they talk about those ideas. The leaders and core nodes in the intellectual network will be AIs, but there will be human “fan clubs”, like third-tier thinkers getting together in pubs to discuss what their heroes have said recently.
Another alternative is that learning from the AIs will not be interesting since that lacks the human element or is too vastly superhuman. But we have a rich history of thousands of real humans who had human struggles with ideas. Science might become history of science and (non-moral) philosophy might become history of philosophy. There won’t be a hundred books about Newton and Goethe but a hundred thousand. The historical greats will become saints and objects of sacred attention with temples and cults. We’ll add no more names to the list of greats but we’ll keep adding names to the list of High Priests of Keynes, like a now-settled warrior aristocracy clinging forever to the memory of its ancestors who once rode out and conquered new lands.
Smith and Montesquieu thought that markets and commerce made us better: that they create an incentive to pursue self-improvement and to create things of value for others. In the positive AI visions, where the labor of humans is made redundant, I find myself wondering how we fare in the presumptive absence of these incentive gradients. Perhaps we are released to a life of freedom, where we can study Mozart and read Dickens, but that still seems complicated: both Mozart and Dickens were themselves deeply commercially-motivated in the production of their work, as were most of the great artists through human history. If the premise is that nobody will need to work or produce, how confident are we that we actually get the next Mozart and Dickens? The relevant question is not the partial equilibrium of whether one individual can pursue a life of enlightened leisure, but the general equilibrium of what form a society as a whole will take on.
One could maybe invoke Periclean Athens or the aristocratic gentleman scientists of Victorian England as a counterpoint. While these individuals were perhaps not motivated by commercial considerations, they were embedded in wider societies shaped by commerce, attendant betterment, and trade: Byron was himself upper class, but he was also surrounded by and writing for an educated bourgeois audience. So we’re back to the equilibrium question. Furthermore, even these individuals were surely motivated by a sense of high-stakes and consequential agency: if they did not apply themselves to their labors, they presumably believed that the work would not otherwise exist. Thucydides was addressing pressing military matters.
So I would like to read more optimistic cases from AI proponents about what a society (vs individual life) looks like if everything goes well: what people do, why they do it, whether humans achieve excellence (and in which domains), and which historical groups we should look to as relevant precedent.
One can perhaps imagine that humans will turn out to have a strong preference for work created by other humans. This may work in certain domains (ceramics?), but for how many will it actually apply? (I’m told that much of what is sold on indie crafts websites is now in fact manufactured in China.) It’s hard to see how this human preference, even if strong, would, for example, save scholarship.
Another idea would be to accept that nobody will become Einstein or Mozart or Byron, and that human excellence as such diminishes, but that there are compensatory benefits (planet brains and Dyson swarms?).
I believe that we can satisfy individual desires, but to what extent will we cultivate behavior worthy of admiration? Will a post-scarcity society mold capable and ambitious people? Which institutions will sustain them and which responsibilities will they have? I’d like to hear more of the equilibrium for the maximalist case spelled out.
Smith and Montesquieu thought that markets and commerce made us better: that they create an incentive to pursue self-improvement and to create things of value for others. In the positive AI visions, where the labor of humans is made redundant, I find myself wondering how we fare in the presumptive absence of these incentive gradients. Perhaps we are released to a life of freedom, where we can study Mozart and read Dickens, but that still seems complicated: both Mozart and Dickens were themselves deeply commercially-motivated in the production of their work, as were most of the great artists through human history. If the premise is that nobody will need to work or produce, how confident are we that we actually get the next Mozart and Dickens? The relevant question is not the partial equilibrium of whether one individual can pursue a life of enlightened leisure, but the general equilibrium of what form a society as a whole will take on.
One could maybe invoke Periclean Athens or the aristocratic gentleman scientists of Victorian England as a counterpoint. While these individuals were perhaps not motivated by commercial considerations, they were embedded in wider societies shaped by commerce, attendant betterment, and trade: Byron was himself upper class, but he was also surrounded by and writing for an educated bourgeois audience. So we’re back to the equilibrium question. Furthermore, even these individuals were surely motivated by a sense of high-stakes and consequential agency: if they did not apply themselves to their labors, they presumably believed that the work would not otherwise exist. Thucydides was addressing pressing military matters.
So I would like to read more optimistic cases from AI proponents about what a society (vs individual life) looks like if everything goes well: what people do, why they do it, whether humans achieve excellence (and in which domains), and which historical groups we should look to as relevant precedent.
One can perhaps imagine that humans will turn out to have a strong preference for work created by other humans. This may work in certain domains (ceramics?), but for how many will it actually apply? (I’m told that much of what is sold on indie crafts websites is now in fact manufactured in China.) It’s hard to see how this human preference, even if strong, would, for example, save scholarship.
Another idea would be to accept that nobody will become Einstein or Mozart or Byron, and that human excellence as such diminishes, but that there are compensatory benefits (planet brains and Dyson swarms?).
I believe that we can satisfy individual desires, but to what extent will we cultivate behavior worthy of admiration? Will a post-scarcity society mold capable and ambitious people? Which institutions will sustain them and which responsibilities will they have? I’d like to hear more of the equilibrium for the maximalist case spelled out.
A friend recently prompted his own Linux ABI-compatible OS for his cloud applications. Why use off-the-shelf libc or device drivers or TCP stack, with all of the attendant bloat and attack surface? PromptOS is also much faster than stock Linux in production. I suspect that everyone will be doing this very soon.
OpenRouter is serving ~125% more tokens per week than it was when we first announced this acquisition in August.
We have a lot of ideas for how to integrate Stripe's and OpenRouter's capabilities in the months ahead.
Patrick Collison retweeted
Two quick thoughts.
1) I appreciate the Grossman vs Dostoevsky comparison. I have not read BK yet, but have read other Dostoevsky (C&P, Demons, Undergound). I appreciate the comparison [1/x]
Brothers Karamazov was Einstein’s favorite novel, a verdict he shared with Freud, Hillary Clinton, and Murakami. Dostoyevsky was Pope Francis’s favorite author. Indeed, he approvingly quoted Elder Zosima; perhaps an interesting case of art molding life. At the risk of betraying my relative shallowness and inferiority, I confess that I did not love it.
Written in the shadow of the death of Dostoyevsky’s son (also Alyosha), and, more broadly, after a life of repeated tragedy, Karamazov attempts most of all to address the problem of evil in Christianity. Ivan presents a trenchant argument, asking how the suffering of children may possibly be explained given the existence of a supposedly benevolent God (Dostoyevsky collected real court cases for Ivan), culminating in Ivan’s famous return of the ticket.
The book gives some sense for how dislocating the nineteenth century must have been. The ascendant authority of science, the spread of materialist philosophy, the doctrine of evolution, the aftermath of the French revolution and its supposedly enlightened empiricism: in Karamazov, we get the feeling that finding some kind of consilience wasn’t just an abstract philosophical challenge, but a source of intense spiritual torment. If inherited tradition is no longer an adequate basis for faith, why would we rationally cleave to an apparently irrational theology? All of this was in the air: it was only two years later that Nietzsche declared God to be dead.
Perhaps demonstrating the utility of the novel as a medium, Dostoyevsky does not even attempt to solve the problem, but merely to illustrate a response, showing how individuals (Alyosha, Elder Zosima) may in the face of the inherent injustice present in the world nonetheless pursue lives of benevolence and charity: theodicy-by-example. In so doing, Dostoyevsky tacitly concedes that none of the teetering justifications expounded over the centuries can actually survive critical pressure and be defended through pure logic.
Ultimately, though, I don’t find myself being fully compelled by Dostoyevsky’s characterization of the problem or his proposed solution. As another sprawling confrontation with and attempt to reconcile the problem of evil, Grossman’s Life and Fate is maybe a useful counterpoint. Unlike Karamazov, Life and Fate shows actual people confronting great wickedness. Ikonnikov, a small but important figure, is ordered to help in the construction of a gas chamber. He refuses, with full awareness of the consequences that will ensue. The Karamazovs, by contrast, live middle class lives unvisited by greater events. Ivan has money, education, and leisure; his torment is the invention of his own mind and thus a kind of self-indulgence. Even Alyosha, the novel’s most sympathetic character, is never tested. His crisis is spiritual: there is a slightly comic kerfuffle about Zosima’s noisome corpse, which challenges his faith, but no circumstance requires him to stake his life or even his comfort.
Thus, a fundamental issue with Karamazov is that the problems of the book are on some level fake: they’re the self-inflicted derangements of febrile and dysregulated men. How much can or should we learn from the insane?
To be charitable to Dostoyevsky, we might say that he understood the spiritual dislocation of the era that later gives rise to the larger evils of totalitarianism in the twentieth, even prefiguring them in the Grand Inquisitor. (Dostoyevsky explored this theme in greater detail a few years earlier in Demons.) Camus in 1959: “The real nineteenth century prophet was Dostoevsky, not Karl Marx.” In this interpretation, the problems in Karamazov set the stage for those in Life and Fate.
Maybe. At least as a work of art, I’m not sure that this anticipation is enough to make the book stand on its own. In Karamazov, one continually wonders why the brothers don’t just pull it together. Dostoyevsky seems to transpose his own inner depths and spiritual torment onto his characters, but most people are not tortured writers, and it does not feel that the unhingedness of the characters is ever fully earned.
In attempting to address evil, Grossman’s conclusion is ostensibly similar to Dostoyevsky’s: the only resolution lies in senseless kindness. For Dostoyevsky, this message is embodied in Alyosha, who represents a kind of fervent innocence. For me, however, it’s not clear that Alyosha ever fathoms the realities and extremities of evil, and hence he’s not fully persuasive: does he even reckon with the misdeeds of his brothers?
Grossman is willing to engage head on. Far beyond gruesome newspaper anecdotes or neurotic and volatile siblings, Ikonnikov directly experiences the Holodomor in Ukraine and then the murders of the Jews. He has no patience for the kind of revolutionary ideas that animated Ivan’s contemporaries: “whenever we see [the dawn of an eternal good], the blood of old people and children is always shed.”
Alyosha believes in the Church and is willing to set aside its failures to address suffering. The book closes on his declaration that all shall rise again. That is, Alyosha does not accept the tragedy of Ilyusha, an innocent boy’s death, but rather seeks to deny and escape it. “We shall see each other and shall tell each other with joy and gladness all that has happened.”
Life and Fate flatly rejects providential resolution. The heavens may be empty, and there is no greater meaning in evil. We can simply choose (freedom the other great theme of Life and Fate) to pursue acts of charity, generosity, and comfort:
“Yes, as well as this terrible Good with a capital ‘G’, there is everyday human kindness. The kindness of an old woman carrying a piece of bread to a prisoner, the kindness of a soldier allowing a wounded enemy to drink from his water-flask, the kindness of youth towards age, the kindness of a peasant hiding an old Jew in his loft. The kindness of a prison guard who risks his own liberty to pass on letters written by a prisoner not to his ideological comrades, but to his wife and mother.”
These acts don’t ennoble the suffering but are instead justified on their own terms. Such altruism cannot become a catechism, as clearly lies in Alyosha’s destiny (and Karamazov was planned before Dostoyevsky's death as the first of two works); instead, our kindness must be senseless. And we should presume no salvation in adherence: Alyosha imagines a kind of sacred tutelage, but Ikonnikov is unceremoniously shot.
Karamazov doesn’t show true evil, and Dostoyevsky’s solution, such as it is, involves a kind of denial, or at least evasion through metaphysics. Grossman saw it directly, and instead argues, humanistically, that we should be kind just because.
—
If Dostoyevsky came to his works by trying to understand and depict Russian society, they in turn became tapestries for others to understand national souls.
In the aftermath of WWI, Russia was the great power defined in opposition to the West. As Germany tried to rediscover its own soul in the wreckage of defeat, it looked east to Russia, and frequently to Dostoyevsky himself.
Carl Jung thought that the German people had a kind of Karamazovian quality. In particular, he believed that Christianity had disciplined them without fully transforming the impulses beneath their ostensibly civilized conduct: the “Germanic barbarian” was divided into upper and lower halves. Religion had domesticated the former while leaving the latter untamed. Waning faith consequently threatened to release forces that its authority had long restrained: “As the Christian view of the world loses its authority, the more menacingly will the ‘blond beast’ be heard prowling about in its underground prison, ready at any moment to burst out with devastating consequences. When this happens in the individual it brings about a psychological revolution, but it can also take a social form.”
Dostoyevsky was reputedly invoked on a weekly basis at Max Weber’s Sunday gatherings. At the beginning of Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, Thomas Mann’s later-repudiated 1918 nationalist polemic, he quotes approvingly Dostoyevsky’s characterization of Germany as the “protesting Western empire”, never quite adopting or feeling at home with the inheritance of Rome. In the same year, Spengler wrote Decline of the West, and explicitly perceived in Russia a youthful vigor, primitiveness, and irrationality that contrasted with the senile high culture of the German and Western worlds. In Magic Mountain, Mann later used Clavdia Chauchat to personify the seductive dangers of Eastern (i.e. Russian) illogic.
Hermann Hesse declared that, for all their differences, Fyodor, Dmitri, Ivan, and Alyosha are actually all of one type; the Russian man. In them, he perceived that “the ideal of the Karamazov, primeval, Asiatic, and occult, is already beginning to consume the European soul”, which was leading to the downfall of Europe. In Hesse’s conception, the Russian man rejects inherited ethics and morals, and even beneficent Alyosha represents an “amoral impartiality.” Man is, Hesse says, halfway between animals and higher consciousness; the former restrained through the process of civilization and domestication. The Karamazovs represent the fraying of the ties.
Hesse proceeds, ominously, to notice that the Germans in particular are more vulnerable than any European people to the temptations of “all those evils which one may regard in different ways, but which collectively signify the Karamazov.” While he was prescient in anticipating some of what would follow, he was in the end too sanguine in his hope that the spiritual dislocation could remain limited to that. “It is possible that the whole Downfall of Europe will play itself out only inwardly, only in the souls of a generation, only in changing the meaning of worn-out symbols, in the dis-valuation of spiritual values.” Alas!
In general, it is interesting to trace the mutual obsession between Russia and Germany: how preoccupied each was with the respective supposedly corrupting influences; how urgent the question of the national soul was felt to be. Many of the analyses seem a bit contradictory—Hesse actually inverts Dostoyevsky, for whom “everything is permitted” nihilism is a Western import for which Russian Orthodoxy is the cure—but there’s a striking intensity in the attempts to apprehend.
Most of all, I’m struck by how anachronistic it all feels today: a country’s writers investigating the national soul and the nation’s fate through the lens of foreign literature.
Which novels or works of art do we use to understand our contemporary issues? Should we be using such works? Do they inform or do they mislead? Today, the US worries a lot about China, but this mostly manifests at the level of trade balances, AI policy, and military prowess. We don’t seem to worry much about the spiritual force of Chinese ideals, and for all of the policy fractiousness, China continues to import and absorb American culture with enthusiasm that is mostly undimmed. There is a genre of jeremiad and cultural analysis in the US that rhymes a little with early twentieth century German criticism, but it today tends to be much more clinical, hinging around PISA scores, smartphones, lower fertility, and not around higher aspirations and ideals as such. So, to what extent should there be analyses of the national soul? And to what extent should they connect with major novels and works of art?
Patrick Collison retweeted
today I discovered a walking route to work that’s 2 minutes longer than the maps default, but takes me past a park, beautiful architecture, and a street full of cafés and life. such a huge upgrade to a journey I make every morning
I want Alive Maps, a version of Google Maps that optimises for beauty, serendipity, and aliveness instead of speed
🤖 Made with AI
Patrick Collison retweeted
It's crazy that these top journals never woke up from 2020.
An enormous failure of stewardship by the organizations that run them.
The "editorial" parts of NEJM, Science, etc. do so much harm to public perception of science. Why do this? Are we going to publish (basically the exact same essay) from a Pentecostal preacher? Science is too important for human prosperity to do this: kevinbryanecon.com/trust.htm…
Patrick Collison retweeted
Of Patrick's trilemma I think the obv one to sacrifice is utilitarianism - IMO it's been clear for a long time that it is going to have really perverse conclusions when taken too far, and the interesting/hard question is what is "too far." E.g. @tylercowen raised this critique here conversationswithtyler.com/e… ; I also see this as a big part of the implicit argument here: forum.effectivealtruism.org/…
Two things I’ve been thinking about regarding AI:
• People often highlight the risks involved in AI, which are surely very real. I’m struck, however, by how hard it is to understand the contours of the positive scenario. There are easy-to-perceive and frequently invoked elements of a positive vision — more diseases cured, more material abundance, etc. — which sound great, but these are by themselves just ingredients. I’m curious what the larger equilibrium is supposed to look like. Do people work? If so, why? What is their marginal contribution? If not, how are resources allocated? What is scarce? What is the ratio between humans and AIs? Are humans in control, whatever that means? One sometimes hears the Culture novels invoked as one scenario, but I’m not sure they depict a desirable outcome. (AI runs everything and humans compete in games? Iain Banks himself said that the humans in the Culture are “somewhere between passengers, pets and parasites.”) There is Richard Brautigan’s famous poem, but do we want to be “returned to our mammal brothers and sisters”? (Isn’t that rewinding Genesis?) We could say that it was hard to imagine the world of 1900 from the vantage point of 1700, and that’s assuredly true. But nobody in 1700 was trying to recast humanity itself within a couple of years — things necessarily unfolded slowly and by increments, and therefore with the possibility for error correction. Given how rapid the rate of progress in AI may be, it feels strange for the upside case to be so opaque.
• There is increasing discussion of whether AIs are conscious or how we would know whether they are, with conclusions there often assumed to be relevant to matters of moral worth. At first blush, this seems a rather arcane, benign, or even absurd issue. (Remember the response to Blake Lemoine’s fears.) Setting aside the terms of the debate itself, or the relevant demarcation criteria, it seems to me a quite high-stakes question, for an affirmative answer — that is, granting moral worth to AIs — would presumably mean that the aggregate worth of AIs would soon outweigh that of humans in any utilitarian calculus. The AIs will be exceptionally wise and intelligent, and vastly more numerous (especially once one considers the imminent future and the AIs not yet born). As such, even epsilon of moral worth will multiply to a lot once one considers the quadrillions that could soon exist. (This is effectively a distributed version of the Nozick’s utility monster.) If this conclusion is unpalatable, I think one of three propositions needs to be rejected: the premise AIs can have moral worth; utilitarianism itself; or the belief that there is even a possibility that they will be far more numerous than humans.
With both of these matters (contours of future society; AI moral worth), there is the possibility of dramatic change. Today, people argue about datacenters. I’m curious how popular support for AI will evolve as more people come to understand these medium-term questions and the relevant stakes. What is the vision for AI that most people would be excited about?
Cool! Kudos to @bchesky. sfchronicle.com/sf/article/a…
Two things I’ve been thinking about regarding AI:
• People often highlight the risks involved in AI, which are surely very real. I’m struck, however, by how hard it is to understand the contours of the positive scenario. There are easy-to-perceive and frequently invoked elements of a positive vision — more diseases cured, more material abundance, etc. — which sound great, but these are by themselves just ingredients. I’m curious what the larger equilibrium is supposed to look like. Do people work? If so, why? What is their marginal contribution? If not, how are resources allocated? What is scarce? What is the ratio between humans and AIs? Are humans in control, whatever that means? One sometimes hears the Culture novels invoked as one scenario, but I’m not sure they depict a desirable outcome. (AI runs everything and humans compete in games? Iain Banks himself said that the humans in the Culture are “somewhere between passengers, pets and parasites.”) There is Richard Brautigan’s famous poem, but do we want to be “returned to our mammal brothers and sisters”? (Isn’t that rewinding Genesis?) We could say that it was hard to imagine the world of 1900 from the vantage point of 1700, and that’s assuredly true. But nobody in 1700 was trying to recast humanity itself within a couple of years — things necessarily unfolded slowly and by increments, and therefore with the possibility for error correction. Given how rapid the rate of progress in AI may be, it feels strange for the upside case to be so opaque.
• There is increasing discussion of whether AIs are conscious or how we would know whether they are, with conclusions there often assumed to be relevant to matters of moral worth. At first blush, this seems a rather arcane, benign, or even absurd issue. (Remember the response to Blake Lemoine’s fears.) Setting aside the terms of the debate itself, or the relevant demarcation criteria, it seems to me a quite high-stakes question, for an affirmative answer — that is, granting moral worth to AIs — would presumably mean that the aggregate worth of AIs would soon outweigh that of humans in any utilitarian calculus. The AIs will be exceptionally wise and intelligent, and vastly more numerous (especially once one considers the imminent future and the AIs not yet born). As such, even epsilon of moral worth will multiply to a lot once one considers the quadrillions that could soon exist. (This is effectively a distributed version of the Nozick’s utility monster.) If this conclusion is unpalatable, I think one of three propositions needs to be rejected: the premise AIs can have moral worth; utilitarianism itself; or the belief that there is even a possibility that they will be far more numerous than humans.
With both of these matters (contours of future society; AI moral worth), there is the possibility of dramatic change. Today, people argue about datacenters. I’m curious how popular support for AI will evolve as more people come to understand these medium-term questions and the relevant stakes. What is the vision for AI that most people would be excited about?
Come help us figure out how the economy should work for agents. Pretty much every part of the stack is going to change.
you already knew this, but repeating @stripe is hiring engineers/product people who wanna solve Hard Problems™️ in agentic commerce, e.g.:
- wallets
- payments
- identity
- risk
- discovery
- tokens
- tools
- provisioning
- catalogs
- micropayments
- etc.
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