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Zcash NU7 support is here 🔐
Update your Keystone to the latest V-3.2.2 Cypherpunk firmware and keep managing your $ZEC just like before.
Big thanks to the ZEC fam for being patient while we got this one ready.
Shield them all 🛡️
If you can’t spot the wrong address, you’ll get rekt 🥲
A secure screen helps you verify every character of the address before you sign, where malware on your phone or PC can’t alter it 🛡️
Another reason to choose a secure-screen hardware wallet over a screenless one.
⚠️ Always read the full wallet address before you hit send.
Attackers slipped malware into scripts from Optimizely, a marketing tool used by major brands. It reached visitors on the sites of 178 organizations, including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, and GitLab.
One script, served to every visitor:
➡️ Swaps crypto addresses on the page and in your clipboard
➡️ Skims cards typed into a site's own checkout form
➡️ Steals cookies and a screenshot when it swaps an address near wallet or payment text
➡️ Targets iPhones and iPads with the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits
The swapper validates checksums, so it only replaces real addresses on BTC, ETH, and EVM chains, Solana, TRON, TON, and more. It worked: about $7,040 hit the attacker's wallets in roughly nine hours on Nov 16.
How to protect yourself:
A) Update your iPhone or iPad to the latest iOS it supports
B) Check the full address on your hardware wallet screen, not just the first and last 4 characters
C) Compare it to the original source, not your clipboard
D) Use a saved address book or whitelist
E) Send a small test transaction first
Site owners: @Scott_Helme's team has the full breakdown and cleanup steps.
We’re looking into more private delivery options worldwide, and we need your help 🙌
Which major carriers in your country offer pickup points, lockers, or other ways to skip giving out your home address?
Drop them below. We are reading every reply.
Buy Keystone Anonymously 💪
The privacy-friendly PO Box delivery option is live now!
No home address needed. Order your Keystone to the nearest PO Box.
No data shared = no leak risk.
Combined with our existing privacy pickup option, this is a perfect addition to your privacy setup.
Your asset safety and personal safety are non-negotiable for us.
A few things to note before your PO Box order:
→ Ensure your PO Box is active and able to receive packages. Double-check the PO Box address before ordering.
→ Once tracking shows "Delivered," the package is considered delivered, and no further shipping claims can be initiated.
Privacy is for everyone 🔒
Never use an iPhone as your hardware wallet.
Unlike hardware wallets, phones run millions of lines of code. More code, more attack surface, more zero-days.
DarkSword just proved it, pulling seed phrases straight from iPhones.
Use a device built only to secure your keys
🚨 Remember DarkSword from March?
Looks like the same crew is back, and this time they added a crypto seed stealer to the mix.
13 malicious packages got buried inside Packagist, a library registry used by PHP sites worldwide. Sites that installed these themes started quietly serving the attack to every iPhone visitor without knowing it.
Here's the chain: a hidden iframe detects your iOS version, exploits two WebKit flaws, breaks out of Safari's sandbox, and reaches the kernel. Full device access without any clicks or warnings.
On August 12, they redeployed with a new payload targeting seed phrases from Phantom, Trust Wallet, OKX, Tonkeeper, Bitget, and more, pulling them straight out of your iPhone's keychain.
Affected: iOS 18.4 through 18.6.x.
What to do:
→ Update to iOS 18.7.3 or 26.2 minimum, right now.
→ If your seed phrase lives on your phone, it's one page load away from being gone.
→ Generate it offline and move it to a hardware wallet.
⚠️ Always read the full wallet address before you hit send.
Attackers slipped malware into scripts from Optimizely, a marketing tool used by major brands. It reached visitors on the sites of 178 organizations, including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, and GitLab.
One script, served to every visitor:
➡️ Swaps crypto addresses on the page and in your clipboard
➡️ Skims cards typed into a site's own checkout form
➡️ Steals cookies and a screenshot when it swaps an address near wallet or payment text
➡️ Targets iPhones and iPads with the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits
The swapper validates checksums, so it only replaces real addresses on BTC, ETH, and EVM chains, Solana, TRON, TON, and more. It worked: about $7,040 hit the attacker's wallets in roughly nine hours on Nov 16.
How to protect yourself:
A) Update your iPhone or iPad to the latest iOS it supports
B) Check the full address on your hardware wallet screen, not just the first and last 4 characters
C) Compare it to the original source, not your clipboard
D) Use a saved address book or whitelist
E) Send a small test transaction first
Site owners: @Scott_Helme's team has the full breakdown and cleanup steps.
⚠️ If you have WhatsApp on the same computer you use for crypto, read this.
A trader just lost nearly everything to a WhatsApp attack. The hackers got into his PC, watched his Hyperliquid short positions for 5 days, then closed them and moved the funds out through Tornado Cash.
The way in? WhatsApp Desktop's auto-download setting.
It's on by default, so the malicious payload landed on his PC by itself. He never clicked a thing.
This is why your crypto should live on a dedicated device with nothing else installed.
If that's not an option, turn on Strict Account:
Settings > Privacy > Advanced > Strict account settings > ON
It locks your account down so:
- Only contacts can add you to groups
- Calls from unknown numbers are silenced
- Link previews are off, so your IP stays hidden
- Attachments and media from unknown senders get blocked
And if you don't trade often, keep your keys on an air-gapped signing device like Keystone 3 Pro. They never touch the internet, so malware has nothing to grab.
Stay safe out there.
Last night I was hacked.
The hack was delivered via WhatsApp payload. Downloaded automatically and gave access and or computer use to the attacker.
They waited 5 days, following my tweets on X of short positions and closed everything and withdrew directly in one transaction from Hyperliquid > Metamask > Tornado Cash.
The attacker waited patiently and closed shorts as the market got to 68k and withdrew everything. Clearly a crypto native attacker.
They also gained access to my metamask, email, websites, and all of my passwords including X.
It’s the most brutal thing as I kept everything over the past few days in crypto and on-chain off Coinbase/Kraken. I was planning to move funds back to my Revolut before Christmas time.
Every single penny in dollars was taken, apart from $800. It’s gone, and in the process of being washed.
Truly the most devastating day I’ve had in my life. Completely shocked by it all to be honest.
I will recover, but this was very sophisticated tech, it caught me completely off guard. The timing was impeccable and it’s obviously been planned for a while.
Stay safe everyone, will keep you updated. I fear the worst is to come and this incident has set me back many years of savings, time and hard work.
Brutal.
📢 Suiet wallet is sunsetting on November 14.
Using your Keystone with Suiet for $SUI? Two solid wallets to switch to:
@Nightly_app
@Backpack
No need to enter your seed phrase anywhere. Just connect your Keystone, and you’re all set.
Know a Suiet user? Send this their way.
🚨 A friend in crypto invites you to a quick video call. You see their face. It isn't them.
The FBI just flagged "FaceStealer," a North Korean campaign that has stolen over $400M in crypto in 18 months.
How it plays out:
→ The invite comes from a hacked account of someone you know
→ On the call, you see prerecorded video of that person, plus deepfakes of big crypto names
→ Midway, they say they can't hear you and send a quick "fix"
→ That fix is the malware
Once in, it logs keystrokes, records your screen, steals cookies, and opens a backdoor.
The worst part?
They record your webcam during the call. Your face becomes the bait for your friends.
Then they wait. They copy your recovery phrase, watch your balance on-chain, and empty the wallet after a big transfer lands.
What to do:
→ Join only through the official app with a meeting code
→ Confirm every invite on another channel
→ Never run a script or paste code into your terminal mid-call
→ Keep only small amounts in browser wallets
→ Store the rest on an air-gapped hardware wallet
→ Never keep your recovery phrase or keys on any online device
A familiar face proves nothing now. Keep your keys off the computer you take calls on.
The FBI is warning the public about FaceStealer, a highly effective social engineering scheme used by North Korean cyber actors to steal cryptocurrency and target the software supply chain. FaceStealer uses imposter versions of video conference platforms, secretly recorded web camera video, and computer intrusions to target individuals working in the cryptocurrency/Web3 industry and open-source software maintainers.
Over the last 18 months, the scheme has resulted in the theft of more than $400 million dollars. Today, the FBI announced the disruption of cloud-based infrastructure used in the scheme, identifying and seizing over 900 webcam videos of victims worldwide. For more on the @FBILosAngeles -led investigation, read: justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-d…
Anyone who owns cryptocurrency, works in the cryptocurrency/Web3 industry, or maintains open-source software repositories is a potential target. The FBI recommends anyone potentially impacted visit fbi.gov/facestealer for additional information and follow the recommendations provided in the FLASH released today: ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf
🛡️ Security reminder: watch for scams using your personal information
Scammers may use real personal or order details to build trust by pretending to be Keystone support, police, regulators, or an exchange.
If anyone contacts you about securing your assets, assisting an investigation, or recovering funds, stop. Verify who they are through an official channel you look up yourself, never one they give you.
⚠️ Knowing your name, order details, or address does not prove who someone is.
🔐 Never share your recovery phrase, private keys, or device PIN with anyone.
🚫 Never move assets to a "safe account," "regulatory wallet," or any address someone gives you.
⚠️ Be wary of any request to connect your wallet, sign a transaction you don't recognize, grant token approvals, or install unknown software.
Protecting your personal information is Keystone's responsibility. We're continuing to strengthen those protections, and we want to help you spot and shut down these attacks.
Stay alert. Keep your assets safe 🛡️
GM 🌞
Your signing device can be replaced.
Your seed phrase can't.
Back it up offline. Secure it on an SS tablet.
That's fund recovery 101 🫡
Keystone Hardware Wallet retweeted
Keystone hardware wallet support for Zcash's NU7 upgrade is now live.
Update to the latest firmware today ↓
Zcash NU7 support is here 🔐
Update your Keystone to the latest V-3.2.2 Cypherpunk firmware and keep managing your $ZEC just like before.
Big thanks to the ZEC fam for being patient while we got this one ready.
Shield them all 🛡️
Unlabeled seed phrases are fine until you need to know which wallet they open 🤦♂️
Your Keystone can tell you which backup belongs to it: "…" → Device Settings → Wallet Settings → Seed Phrase Check
Tag the friend with a drawer full of mystery backups.
Typing your wallet password in a packed coffee shop? Bold move.
With Keystone 3 Pro, you sign txns with your fingerprint.
Verify, tap, done 👍
How much of your signing device do you have to take on faith? 🤔
With Keystone, none of it 🔐
Firmware: Rebuild and verify it.
Entropy: Roll your own dice.
Signing: Inspect every QR, fully air-gapped.
Every layer is yours to check.
Our latest iOS app update is now live!
Update now 🫡
📣 Nexus App security update: please update to v1.3.7
Some Nexus App services were recently hit by a cyberattack, and some of you couldn't use the app normally for a period. Sorry for the disruption.
Our team responded right away and hardened server security. Based on our investigation so far, we've found no evidence that user assets or personal information were affected.
v1.3.7 adds further security hardening. Update as soon as you can:
• Android: live now on Google Play
• iOS: awaiting App Store review. Until it's live, you can sign with any Keystone-supported third-party wallet (full list: [link])
Before installing, check that the developer is listed as "Yanssie HK Limited". Anything else is not us.
We'll keep strengthening the security and stability of our Nexus services and share updates here.
Your wallet app shows a Zcash address. How do you know it's yours?
Unified Addresses rotate for privacy, so the u1... you see today may not match last week's. That part is normal.
But trusting it without checking isn't.
Keystone can check it against your account. Watch 👇
So how do you know? Keystone gives you one of three answers:
✅ Verified: everything matches Account 0
⚠️ Not Fully Verified: what it checked matches; Sapling wasn't checked
❌ Not Verified: something's off. Don't receive there yet
Full guide: keyst.one/zcash/updates/veri…
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